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Abstract
It is well known that U.S. monetary policy is well-approximated by a Taylor rule. This
suggests a reason why good macroeconomic news sometimes depresses equity returns: good
news about the real side of the economy implies tighter future monetary policy. I test this
hypothesis by assessing the e¤ect of news on equity returns after controlling for changes in
expectations of future monetary policy using Fed Funds Futures data. The results do not
support the theory. Furthermore, the negative response of stock markets to unanticipated
ination is unchanged by controlling for changes in monetary policy expectations.
JEL: E44, E52, G14.
Keywords: Fed Funds Futures. Macroeconomic News Surprises. Taylor Rule.
Several recent papers examine how asset prices respond to the surprise component in macro-
economic news. An emerging puzzle is that equity markets respond di¤erently to non-
monetary policy news depending on whether the economy is in a recession or an expansion.
Good macroeconomic news tends to depress equity returns during expansions while markets
respond favorably to positive surprises during recessions (McQueen and Roley 1993; Boyd,
Hu, and Jagannathan 2005; Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega 2005). In aggregate,
the coe¢ cient on positive news surprises is therefore often found to be small although occa-
sionally signicant (Rigobon and Sack 2006). One theory is that this asymmetric response
is because good news during an expansion primarily conveys information about the future
of the risk-free rate.
I test this hypothesis by assessing the response of equity returns to macroeconomic
news after controlling for changes in the markets expectation of future Federal Reserve
policy. I incorporate a market-based measure of changes in expectations of the future risk-
free rate in a standard event study framework to examine the e¤ect of seven major news
announcements on returns. Using real-time measures of the news surprises, I rst assess
how market expectations of the future Federal Funds rate change as a result of each of the
surprises. I then assess how returns respond to each kind of surprise using changes in the
expected Fed Funds rate as a control variable.
I nd no evidence that changes in market expectations of future monetary policy explain
the weak response of equity markets to good news about real activity. The results contrast
with the conclusions drawn by Boyd, Hu, and Jagannathan (2005). Based on the reaction
of bond prices to news, Boyd, Hu, and Jagannathan suggest that the negative reaction of
the stock market to positive employment news during expansions results from changes in
expectations of the risk-free rate. However, bond yields are not in general weighted averages
of expected future short-rates (see, for example, Diebold, Rudebusch, and Arouba 2006) as
predicted by the expectations hypothesis. It is therefore necessary to directly assess the
e¤ect of news on expected future short-rates.
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Section 1 discusses the di¤erent channels through which macroeconomic surprises may
a¤ect returns. Section 2 assesses the e¤ect of news surprises on expectations of future
monetary policy. Section 3 examines the e¤ect of news on equity and bond returns after
controlling for the e¤ect of the news on expectations of future monetary policy.
1 Theoretical Framework
As is well-known, U.S. monetary policy is well approximated by a foreward-looking Taylor
rule. That is, the Federal Reserve responds to increases in expected output or expected
ination above trend by increasing the Fed Funds rate. Letting RFt be the Fed Funds rate,
t and Yt be some measures of ination and real activity at date t with  and Y their
steady-state levels, the market expectation for RFt+j can be described by
EtR
F
t+j = Et(t+j   ) + YEt (Yt+j   Y )




t+j   EtRFt+j =  (Et+j   Ett+j) + Y (EYt+j   EtYt+j)
Macroeconomic news surprises that contain information about either t+j or Yt+j will thus
raise market expectations for the future risk-free rate.
I consider two broad classes of indicators: indicators with information primarily about
the real side of the economy (i.e., information relevant to expectations of Yt+j) and those with
information about the nominal side of the economy (i.e., information relevant to expectations
of t+j). As a result of the information structure above, each indicator will in general contain
information about two or more of factors that a¤ect equity returns. Good news about the real
side of the economy implies higher future risk-free rates and higher cash ows. According
2
to general equilibrium asset pricing models where the price of an asset is the sum of its
expected future discounted dividends, good news about future cash ows should increase
equity returns. The cash ow and Fed Funds channel thus work in opposite direction for all
broad measures of real U.S. economic activity.
News about the nominal side of the economy includes information about both future
ination and future monetary policy. Higher than expected ination should decrease equity
returns as a result of the increase in the expected risk-free rate. Furthermore, several expla-
nations for the negative correlation between ination and stock returns do not center on the
link between ination and monetary policy. See Goto and Valkanov (2002) or Ritter and
Warr (2002) for reviews of this literature.
2 The E¤ect of News onMonetary Policy Expectations
Market e¢ ciency implies that markets should only react to the unanticipated component
in macroeconomic news announcements; by the time of the news release, prices already
incorporate the anticipated component of the news. The right measure of news is thus the
deviation of the indicator from the markets consensus forecast for it.
I normalize the surprise component of each news announcement by dividing by the
standard deviation of the news surprise in the sample as in Balduzzi, Elton, and Green
(2001) and Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2003, 2005). That is, for each indicator




where Ak;t is the actual real-time value of indicator k announced at date t, Ek;t is the con-
sensus forecast for the indicator, and ^k is the sample standard deviation of Ak;t Ek;t. The
negative of the unemployment surprise is used such that a decrease in the unemployment
rate is recorded as a positive news surprise.
The group of indicators that primarily contain information about the real side of the
economy includes the Unemployment Rate, New Home Sales, Advance GDP, Consumer
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Condence, and Capacity Utilization. The second group consists of core CPI and core PPI.
I follow Kuttner (2001) in using Fed Funds futures rates to gauge marketsexpecta-
tion for future monetary policy. The sample consists of daily data from October 18th, 1991
through October 20th, 2006. These contracts are available for between ve and thirteen
months in advance of month m for the sample period. These contracts provide a measure of
not only the current stance of monetary policy but the markets expectation for future mon-
etary policy. Hamilton (2007) performs several econometric tests on Fed Funds Futures and
nds that they are excellent predictors of future monetary policy. Hamiltons econometric
tests are partly in response to recent work by Piazzesi and Swanson (2006) who argue that
Fed Funds Futures are a biased measure of market expectation of Federal Reserve policy.
In any case, Fed Funds Futures contracts are the best available daily measure of monetary
policy expectations.
Letting Rf;mt denote the Fed Funds futures contract settling m = 1; ::; 6, full months
ahead, the change between date t and t  1 in the markets expectation for the risk-free rate
m full months ahead is
EtRm   Et 1Rm = Rf;mt  Rf;mt 1 .
The e¤ect of the surprise on the markets expectation of the Fed Funds rate m months ahead
is then estimated for indicator k using
Rf;mt  Rf;mt 1 = 0 + 1Sk;t + "t. (2.1)
Table 1 contains the results from estimating this equation for each of the indicators.
With the exception of Advance GDP, all the regressions have the expected signs and are
signicant at almost all horizons with the greatest e¤ects being seen in the 6 month ahead
contracts. The signs on Advance GDP are always positive but never signicant. The lack
of signicance is likely due to the small sample size since it is the only indicator sampled at
the quarterly rather than monthly frequency.
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3 The E¤ect of News on Returns
The data consist of four stock indices: the Dow Jones Composite Average, the NASDAQ
Composite, the NYSE Composite, and the S&P 500 Composite. I assess the e¤ect of news
surprises on government T-bill and bonds using 90-day, six-month, one year, ve-year, and
ten-year yields.
I estimate
















For equities, Rt =
P closet  P closet 1
P closet 1
where P closet is the price of the asset at the end of day t. For
T-bills and bonds, Rt = Y ieldt   Y ieldt 1:
I compare the estimates from (3:1) and (3:2) with the results from estimating
Rt =  + Sk;t + t. (3.3)
Table 2 shows the results of estimating equations (3:2) and (3:3) for equity markets;
the results from estimating equation (3:1) were quite similar to those from (3:2).  and 
are substantively the same for all seven indicators. There is thus no evidence to support the
notion that equity marketsresponse to macroeconomic news is mediated through changes
in monetary policy expectations.
The only news that consistently has signicant e¤ects is core CPI news. This is con-
sistent with the results of Rigobon and Sack (2006). However, the evidence here rules out
the possibility that equity markets respond badly to ination surprises simply because they
imply higher future interest rates.
It is tempting to think that this result is an artifact of illiquidity in the Fed Funds
Futures market. However, table 3 illustrates that including changes in the Fed Funds Futures
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rate explains the bulk of the response of government bond and T-bill markets: most of
the coe¢ cients on the news variables become insignicant after the inclusion of changes
in monetary policy expectations with the exception of those on unemployment. Thus, the
problem does not appear to lie with using Fed Funds Futures as an indicator of monetary
policy.1
Taken together, the results are perplexing: the results from the Fed Funds Futures
market clearly demonstrate that markets understand the Federal Reserves Policy rule. The
results from bill and bond markets indicate that markets rapidly assimilate the anticipated
change in monetary policy. I leave the question of why monetary policy expectations do not
appear to mediate the response of equity markets for future research.
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Data Appendix
The Fed Funds Futures data is taken from Thomson Financials Datastream database. The
series codes are CFF1191, CFF1291,...., CFF0407. I take the asset price data from the
Global Financial Database. Both the consensus forecast and the actual real-time value of
the indicators are from the MMS Survey and were purchased from Haver Analytic.
1The signicantly negative response of yields to positive news about unemployment at longer maturities is
puzzling. I therefore considered whether the same e¤ect was present when using nonfarm payroll employment
data, which is released at the same time as the unemployment rate. After controlling for changes in the
Fed Funds rate the e¤ect of nonfarm payroll employment surprises on longer term yields is indeed positive,
consistent with the view that the slope of the yield curve increases with robust economic growth. The
negative e¤ect of positive news on unemployment is thus likely a statistical anomaly.
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Table 1: The E¤ect of Surprises on Expectations of Future Monetary Policy
Indicator 1-mo. ahead 2-mo. 3-mo. 4-mo. 5-mo. 6-mo.
Unemployment 0:0133 0:0188 0:025 0:0252 0:0296 0:0313
(3:17) (4:41) (5:04) (4:48) (4:76) (4:54)
New Home Sales 0:0046 0:0067 0:0066 0:0078 0:0109 0:0120
(3:46) (3:94) (3:40) (3:25) (3:89) (4:01)
GDP Advance 0:0033 0:0039 0:0060 0:0052 0:0065 0:0065
(1:20) (1:01) (1:18) (0:93) (0:96) (0:84)
Consumer Condence 0:0033 0:0086 0:0111 0:0122 0:0141 0:0152
(2:15) (3:80) (4:86) (4:65) (4:77) (4:57)
Capacity Utilization 0:0067 0:0088 0:0103 0:012 0:0126 0:0145
(3:94) (4:56) (4:51) (4:48) (4:10) (4:21)
Core CPI 0:0053 0:0083 0:0089 0:0116 0:0128 0:0158
(2:94) (3:48) (3:22) (3:53) (3:49) (3:93)
Core PPI 0:0040 0:0053 0:0053 0:0069 0:0059 0:0058
(2:05) (2:35) (1:95) (2:22) (1:55) (1:51)
Notes: a) The numbers in the table are the  coe¢ cients from estimating equation (2:1) for each
of the m month ahead Fed Funds Futures contracts for each of the indicators. b) T-statistics are
in parentheses. c) Bold-faced numbers denote signicance at the 5% level.
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Table 2: News E¤ects on Equity Returns
Indicator Dow Nasdaq NYSE S&P500
       
Unemp.  0:157 0:083  0:169  0:263  0:322 0:147  0:380  0:030
( 0:20) (0:10) ( 0:13) ( 0:18) ( 0:43) (0:18) ( 0:44) ( 0:99)
New Homes  0:478  0:543 0:576  0:106  0:368  0:569  0:251  0:546
( 0:79) ( 0:72) (0:49) ( 0:09) ( 0:57) ( 0:85) ( 0:34) ( 0:72)
GDP Adv. 1:284 1:626 1:217 1:259 0:701 1:100 0:776 1:122
(1:03) (1:31) (0:59) (0:60) (0:54) (0:87) (0:53) (0:77)
Cons. Conf. 0:292 0:194 2:344 1:940 0:124 0:018 0:367 0:188
(0:44) (0:27) (2:02) (1:56) (0:19) (0:03) (0:48) (0:23)
Cap. Util. 0:111 0:416 1:387 1:367 0:609 0:836 0:963 1:193
(0:14) (0:51) (1:17) (1:09) (0:82) (1:07) (1:17) (1:38)
Core CPI  3:331  3:054  4:249  4:289  3:008  2:755  3:264  3:051
( 4:47) ( 4:00) ( 3:77) ( 3:69) ( 4:23) ( 3:77) ( 4:12) ( 3:74)
Core PPI  0:903  0:871  1:790  1:883  1:130  1:112  1:396  1:393
( 1:30) ( 1:23) ( 1:67) ( 1:74) ( 1:60) ( 1:56) ( 1:81) ( 1:78)
Note: The numbers in the table are the coe¢ cients (x1000) on the news surprises from estimating
equations (3:3) and (3:2) for each of the indicators. See also notes to table 1.
9
Table 3: News E¤ects on Government Bill and Bond Yields
Indicator 90-Day T-Bill 6-Month T-Bill 1-Year 5-Year 10-Year
         
Unemp. 4:12  0:66 5:56  0:87 5:04  2:77 2:18  3:84 1:55  2:62
(3.29) (-0.68) (3.71) (-0.86) (2.52) (-1.82) (1.19) (-2.43) (1.17) (-2.23)
New Homes 2:17 0:21 2:40 0:10 2:66  0:42 2:84 0:59 2:57 0:98
(2.23) (0.26) (2.33) (0.12) (1.96) (-0.40) (2.79) (0.75) (3.28) (1.53)
GDP Adv. 2:68 2:00 3:84 2:73 5:09 2:38 3:30 1:59 2:46 1:04
(2.12) (1.73) (3.15) (3.34) (1.92) (1.48) (1.47) (0.88) (1.31) (0.69)
Cons. Conf. 1:84  0:11 3:29 1:05 4:57 1:80 4:70 2:27 3:86 1:79
(2.18) (-0.14) (4.10) (1.47) (4.18) (1.79) (5.11) (2.73) (5.02) (2.60)
Cap. Util. 2:74  0:32 2:84  0:13 4:19  0:00 3:53 0:27 2:69 0:49
(2.80) (-0.42) (3.38) (-0.23) (2.90) (-0.00) (3.00) (0.27) (3.28) (0.70)
Core CPI 1:62  0:74 2:32  0:02 4:19 1:31 4:60 2:10 3:28 1:47
(1.52) (-0.92) (2.44) (-0.03) (3.52) (1.55) (4.13) (2.47) (3.64) (1.98)
Core PPI 0:97  0:06 1:34 0:06 2:26 0:46 1:48  0:00 1:75 0:73
(1.09) (-0.08) (1.55) (0.11) (1.57) (0.41) (1.23) (0.00) (2.01) (1.04)
See notes to tables 1 and 2.
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